Alistair Ramsay is a journalist and political commentator – his latest piece exposes the problems with the current political system. Can voters have any influence over the Government when voting at a general election?
My evidence submitted to the Standing Committee of Tynwald on Constitutional and Legal Affairs and Justice, which is reviewing the Island’s ministerial system of government:
The introduction of ministerial government in the mid-1980s was an important stage in the post-colonial evolution of politics in the Isle of Man. But the system needs to develop further if the Island is to achieve true national democracy.
My name is Alistair Ramsay and I have 45 years experience of Manx politics, both as a journalist/commentator and as a government press officer.
During 18 years in the latter role I worked with five Chief Ministers and regularly attended meetings of the Council of Ministers. I contributed a chapter to volume five of A New History of the Isle of Man (Liverpool University Press 2000) on political developments in the period 1980-96, including the advent of the ministerial system.
The Committee’s interest in this subject is welcome and I wish it well in its endeavours.
Transfer of Power
The introduction of ministerial government completed the transfer of executive authority from the Lieutenant Governor to local politicians.
It concentrated power and responsibility within a minority of Tynwald members, the Council of Ministers, and replaced a multitude of disconnected committees (the boards) with a smaller number of larger departments.
The idea was to provide clear leadership, improve co-ordination, enhance accountability by identifying who was responsible for what, and to make government more decisive and responsive at a time when economic recovery was an urgent priority.
In my view the ministerial system has been broadly successful in these aims and is certainly more effective than the incoherent and unaccountable governance that preceded it.
However, there are two fundamental problems that have become increasingly apparent in recent years. These relate to democratic legitimacy and the quality of the policy making process.
Problem One: Lack of Public Mandate & Collective Accountability
Under the ministerial system the government is collectively accountable to Tynwald.
But it is still not collectively accountable to the public, and this remains the fundamental flaw in Manx politics. By ‘government’ I mean the Council of Ministers plus department members, so this definition covers the vast majority of the House of Keys.
Here I can do no better than quote from an article that I wrote for the Reayrtys website in November 2024:
- MHKs are elected and re-elected on a local basis, as individuals. Once in the House they deal with national issues, for which they have no mandate. They act together, though their collective performance is never subject to the verdict of the people.
- So MHKs operate at a national level with no mandate and no accountability. This freedom is convenient for them, but the general public is disenfranchised.
- The democratic disconnect has become more obvious over the past ten years, with a series of major policy decisions that had no backing from the electorate.
- These include the nationalisation of the Steam Packet, the creation of Manx Care and an economic strategy based on growing the population to 100,000. All changes that were simply not on the agenda at the preceding general election.
- The Island is now struggling with how it can afford high quality health and social care in a low tax environment. There is no mandate for any of the answers to that question because the public has not been asked.
- Our elections ought to give the politicians a steer on these big issues. On the role and size of government, tax and spending, the economy, conservation and development. On what version of the Isle of Man we want to live in.
- But what happens here every five years is not a single election about the condition of the country. It is a series of twelve local popularity contests, the outcome of which is impossible to translate into any national policy direction.
- The time has come to treat Manx voters like adults and allow them to choose the future of their Island. This will require the creation of a national framework around elections to provide for an informed all-island debate on the issues and options.
- How we achieve this is open for discussion. It could be through the growth of parties, public election of the Chief Minister, or even making the Isle of Man one big constituency.
- None of these are perfect solutions. But the current system is no longer fit for purpose and it has to change.
- We cannot carry on electing MHKs on a solely local basis and letting them do what they like at the national level.’
Problem two: Executive dominance
In his 2016 report the eminent parliamentarian Lord Lisvane noted with disapproval that the overwhelming majority of Tynwald members were also members of the government, as department members if not ministers.
This lack of evident separation of roles between Parliament and Executive means the Isle of Man may be seen to fall short of the highest standards of parliamentary governance. This has wider reputational risks.’ Tynwald knew better, however, and continues to allow the blurring of parliamentary and governmental roles. – Lord Lisvane
Recommending a reduction in departmental memberships His Lordship warned: ‘This lack of evident separation of roles between Parliament and Executive means the Isle of Man may be seen to fall short of the highest standards of parliamentary governance. This has wider reputational risks.’ Tynwald knew better, however, and continues to allow the blurring of parliamentary and governmental roles.
This dilution of the parliamentary function helps the executive to dominate. Other factors in the power imbalance include: the collective discipline of the ministerial system (though this is necessary for government coherence); the neutering of the Legislative Council; inexperience amongst backbenchers; and, not least, government’s regular briefing of the entire parliament behind closed doors.
The latter unhealthy practice treats all Tynwald members as government insiders and undermines the integrity of parliament as an independent entity.
It is symptomatic of a political culture that sees the parliament as an extension of the executive, and not as something that should be completely detached from it. The outcome of all this is that Tynwald has often failed to properly challenge and test the quality of government policy proposals when these have been brought forward.
Major Policy Decisions with No Mandate
The examples cited above of major policy decisions with no public mandate are also examples of this uncritical parliamentary acceptance.
The Steam Packet was nationalised without even a policy debate; the report recommending the creation of Manx Care was swallowed whole with no consideration of the implications; and only two members voted against the 100,000 population target despite a whole host of unanswered questions around this radical proposition.
Either these initiatives were so perfect as to be beyond challenge, or most members failed in their duty to apply independent critical thinking to proposals for significant change.
The answer to the imbalance between parliament and executive, I would argue, is to strengthen the former rather than weaken the latter. Any attempt to unwind the ministerial system back towards the chaos of the board structure would be a retrograde step.
Measures to promote the role and status of parliament could include: restrict the number of departmental memberships; encourage MLCs to apply independent scrutiny to policy proposals as well as to legislation; make members briefings part of the parliamentary process and open them up to the public
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